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The spread of international financial shocks to Asean 
countries  
 
Céline Gimet1 
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ABSTRACT 
This article focuses on the reaction of Asean economies to international financial 
shocks. The crises in emerging markets at the end of the last century underlined 
the vulnerability of emerging Asean economies to international financial 
fluctuations and a lack of sustainability in their exchange rate regime. A Structural 
VAR model is used to analyze the efficiency of the measures adopted by these 
countries, after this crisis episode, to protect their economies against speculative 
attacks. The results reveal that the impact of the current subprime crisis on 
emerging Asean countries is less significant than that observed in industrialized 
ones. 
 
JEL Classification: C32, F41, G15. 
Keywords: Asean countries, international financial fluctuations, macroeconomic impact, 
regional integration, SVAR Model. 
 
RÉSUMÉ 
 
Cet article se concentre sur la réaction des économies de l'Asean à des chocs financiers 
internationaux. Les crises qui ont marqué la fin du siècle dernier ont souligné la 
vulnérabilité des pays émergents de la région à des fluctuations financières 
internationales ainsi qu’un manque de soutenabilité de leur régime change. Un modèle 
VAR structurel est utilisé pour analyser l'efficacité des mesures adoptées par ces pays 
après cet épisode de crise pour protéger leurs économies contre les attaques spéculatives. 
Les résultats révèlent que l'impact négatif de la crise actuelle sur les pays émergents de 
l’Asean est moins important que celui observé dans les pays industrialisés. 
 
Classification JEL: C32, F41, G15. 
Mots-clés: Asean, fluctuations financières internationales, impact macro-économique, 
intégration régionale, modèle SVAR. 
                                                
1 Group for Economic Analysis and Theory (GATE) CNRS UMR 5824- University of Lyon . 
ENS Lettres et Sciences Humaines-Bureau R132-15 Parvis René Descartes BP 7000 69342 Lyon cedex 07. 
France. Phone : +33 (0)4 37 37 62 82.Fax : +33 (0)4 37 37 60 24. E-mail : gimet@gate.cnrs.fr 
 
 
2 
 
1. Introduction 
     The last decade has been characterized by the development of many trade areas in 
Europe (EMU, EU, Cefta), Latin America (Mercosur) and Asia (Asean). During this 
period, many emerging countries opened their economy to international trade in order to 
benefit from the growth opportunities resulting from economic integration. Today, most 
of them have reinforced their commercial and financial links to form common markets, 
which correspond to the third stage of the Balassa (1961) classification, and are 
attempting to adopt a common currency in order to form a monetary union. The main 
problem linked to this type of monetary integration is due to external asymmetric 
shocks because the countries have kept their national interest rate and exchange rate as 
instruments of adjustment in the event of shocks (Flood, 1979). This problem is 
particularly significant in emerging markets (Edwards, 2006). The main condition for 
adopting a sustainable monetary union is the ability of the countries to resist these 
shocks. Respecting the traditional criteria of the Optimal Currency Areas theory 
(Mundell, 1961, McKinnon, 1963, Kenen, 1969) is not sufficient today to protect 
countries against exogenous fluctuations. It is important to consider the international 
changes that have taken place since this period. More precisely, the recent crises in 
emerging markets have underlined the fact that it is important to enlarge the concept of 
sustainability: in addition to the lasting stability of economic fundamentals, it is 
essential to consider the strength of the country's banking and financial sectors and the 
risk of illiquidity in a context of information asymmetry. This would help to avoid 
speculative attacks and the spread of financial shocks between countries in the same 
block during periods of international crisis (Corsetti and al., 1999, Chang and al., 
2000). But the numerous financial crises that occurred in emerging markets at the end of 
the last century - in Asia in 1997-1998, in Latin America in 1994, 1999 and 2001 and in 
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Eastern Europe in 1998 and 2001 - have highlighted the inability of these countries to 
adopt this common exchange rate solution. In general, the crisis had harmful effects on 
all the countries of the region where it occurred and sometimes infected more distant 
regions. For example, a “fast and furious” episode of contagion followed the Thai crisis 
(Kaminsky and al., 2003) and most emerging countries of the area that adopted a fixed 
or quasi-fixed exchange rate were forced to let their currency float. 
     But, today, it seems that emerging markets have learned some lessons from these 
crises and have reinforced their structures to protect their banking and financial sectors 
from international fluctuations and speculative attacks. In fact, the subprime crisis, 
which originated in the United States in July 2007, seems to have had spillover effects 
on the banking and financial sectors of Western European countries and Japan and less 
significant impact on emerging markets. Therefore, it is extremely interesting to analyze 
the different effects of these crises on countries in a commercial area according to their 
economic characteristics (industrialized or emerging) and during different crisis 
episodes. More precisely, the purpose of this article is to underline the progress of the 
emerging countries since the nineties crisis episode and their capacity to resist the 
subprime crisis and to draw some conclusions concerning their ability to adopt, in the 
future, a monetary union. The study concentrates on the case of the Asean (Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations) +3 countries2. Two reasons justify this choice. Firstly, this 
is one of the regions most hit by financial crises at the end of the last decade; it is 
interesting to analyze the evolution of the different countries in their ability to stabilize 
their banking and financial sectors in order to guarantee the confidence of international 
 
 
4 
 
lenders. Secondly, this commercial block is made up of industrialized and emerging 
economies; therefore it is important to compare the strength and the duration of the 
shock resulting from different crisis episodes according to these countries' economic 
characteristics. 
     Many econometric instruments can be used to measure the vulnerability of countries 
to an external shock; in particular Vector Auto-Regression (VAR) models (Calvo and 
al., 2000; Bordo and al., 2006).  But Structural Auto-Regression methodology (SVAR) 
seems to be more accurate because it makes it possible to impose identifying restrictions 
on relationships between the model's variables, in reference to the economic theory; it 
enables one to include real and nominal variables and ensures a better interpretation of  
results.  
     A second section deals with the choice of the method, sample and variables used in 
our analysis. In a third section, the results obtained are analyzed. In a fourth section, the 
similarities between the countries are underlined thanks to a correlation test concerning 
their responses to a common shock. A group of countries that have a close economic and 
financial profile and consequently the same reaction to a common shock is identified 
before concluding.  
 
2. An empirical analysis 
2.1. The structural VAR model 
                                                                                                                                            
2 Brunei Darussalam (1984), Cambodia (1999), Indonesia (1967), Laos (1997),  Malaysia (1967), Myanmar 
(1997), Philippines (1967), Singapore (1967), Thailand (1967), Vietnam  (1995) +  China, Japan and South 
Korea (1997). 
 
 
5 
 
The representation of the reduced form of the vector auto-regression model VAR(q) is: 
                                                                             (1)  
Where q is the number of lags, et is a white noise.                      . 
In order to simplify the representation, the variables are divided into two blocks: y1t 
represents the exogenous variable and y2t the domestic variables.  
Thus we have: 
 
 
L is the lag operator. Consequently, the VAR(q) model can be written as: 
  
                                                                                                      (2)   
 
     In order to obtain the shock response functions and the forecast error variance 
decomposition, it is necessary to write the process in the Moving Average infinite 
structural form. An intermediate step consists in “reversing” the canonical VAR model 
according to the Wold Theorem in order to obtain its moving average form: 
                                                                                           (3) 
with Yt-1 the vector of lagged variables, 
 
 
the n x n matrix of the model's parameters, 
 
The error vector whose variance-covariance matrix has no restrictions,  
that is to say    and  E(et) = 0. 
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where et represents the vector of canonical innovations. 
Thus, the structural Moving Average representation is:  
 
                                                                                             (4)
 
          
         with                                                                                                            (5) 
 
     where P is an invertible matrix n x n which has to be estimated in order to identify the 
structural shocks. The short-run constraints are imposed directly on P and correspond to 
some elements of the matrix set to zero. The Θj matrix represents the response functions 
to shocks εt of the elements of Yt. The different structural shocks are supposed to be non-
correlated and to have a unitary variance:  
                                                                                                          (6)    
Ω is the variance-covariance matrix of the canonical innovations et, thus :                  
                                                                       (7) 
 
 2.2. The choice of variable 
 
 
 (5) 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     Our study is based on Asean+3 countries3 for the period 1990M1-2009M7. This is 
divided into two sub-periods4 which correspond to the two main crisis episodes which hit 
Asean countries: the Thai crisis in 1997-1998 and the subprime crisis in 2007-2009. For 
each crisis episode, the purpose is to measure the reaction of Asean countries to this 
international disturbance and to make comparisons between the periods and the countries. 
     The variables are selected so as to see the impact of the international financial shock 
on the countries' economic, monetary and financial sectors. If it hits only the financial 
sphere and involves only a small outflow of capital, we can conclude that the harmful 
consequences of the international disturbance are limited. But, if the shock is propagated 
into the real sector and induces a reaction of the monetary authorities in order to stabilize 
the economies, all sectors are weakened and the time necessary to eliminate the negative 
impact of the crisis is going to be long. 
     In our model, each Asean economy is described by the following vector of 
endogenous variables:
 
 
  The external disturbances (external) retained to represent the different episodes of 
volatility are a positive shock of emerging markets' composite stock exchange index 
                                                
3 Because of the availability of data our sample is only made up of 8 countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, China, Japan and South Korea. 
4 1990M1-1999M12 and 2000M1-2009M7.  
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(MSCI)5 and a positive shock of the variation of the United States' stock exchange index 
(SP)6. The purpose of the paper is to study the impact of the international crisis revealed 
by extreme fluctuations on financial markets. Consequently, the realized volatility7 of 
these indexes is measured. y is industrial production, ner is the nominal exchange rate 
(units of foreign currency for one unit of US Dollar)8, fa is the share of foreign assets 
held by the central bank and r is the nominal interest rate. The succession of variables has 
been chosen in order to make possible the introduction of restrictions.  
     The variables are used in logarithm, except for the interest rate. They are seasonally 
adjusted. It is not necessary to test the stationnarity and the cointegration of the model's 
variables by following the postulate of Sims (1988), Sims and al. (1991) because a 
Bayesian inference is used and the model is not then affected by the presence of a unit 
root.   
     The variables chosen are traditionally used in the literature on structural VAR in order 
to simplify the identification of the model with the inclusion of restrictions generally 
employed in SVAR reference studies. However, some of them have been inspired by 
                                                
5 The MSCI emerging markets index is drawn from Morgan Stanley Capital International database. It is 
composed of 24 emerging market country indices. It is a float-adjusted market capitalization index. It 
makes it possible to measure the equity market performance of emerging markets. 
6 The S&P500 index includes the 500 largest US industrial companies quoted. It covers more than 75% of 
the US equity market.  
7 The realized volatility is well adapted in the case of high-frequency data. It is an ex-post nonparametric 
and unbiased volatility estimator (Andersen and al., 2006, 2009).  
The monthly realized volatility is measured by the standard error of the daily returns for each month.   
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recent financial crisis theory. Thus, the variables y, ner and r can be found in studies 
concerning the impact of monetary fluctuations on economic cycles which underline the 
role of the exchange rate in the spread of the shock (Cushman and al., 1997, Kim and al., 
2000, Canova, 2005, Mackowiak, 2007). The decomposition between supply and demand 
shocks follows the postulate of Gali (1992), Cushman and al. (1997) which is based on 
an ISLM model. Moreover, the literature on the “third generation of crisis” has recently 
underlined the necessity of considering the country's illiquidity risk in the spread of the 
crisis and thus, the role of international reserves in a national economy (Corsetti and al., 
1999, Chang and al., 2000). Finally, the importance of taking into account the 
vulnerability of emerging markets to international fluctuations has been demonstrated by 
Canova (2005), Mackowiak (2007).  
     The originality in this analysis is the inclusion of the two variables of stock exchange 
volatility. This choice is inspired by the recent mechanism of financial contagion during 
crisis episodes in economies whose banking system is vulnerable and illiquidity risk 
significant. Even if the origins of the crisis are different (the 1997 Asian crisis started on 
the foreign exchange markets and the 2008 subprime crisis began in the housing sectors) 
the consequences are identical. The shock causes considerable stock exchange volatility. 
And international lenders' loss of confidence after a crisis in a country can generate a 
portfolio reallocation on the behalf of these investors in order to limit their exposure to 
risk. This situation creates a considerable outflow of capital from economies which have 
the same characteristics as the first country hit by the crisis (Calvo, 1999, Kaminsky and 
al., 1999, Kodres and al., 2002). International reserves decrease and the monetary 
                                                                                                                                            
8 It can be noticed that we use a Bayesian inference. So, in this case, it is not necessary to test the 
stationnarity and the cointegration of the model's variables by following the postulate of Sims (1988), Sims 
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authority may increase the interest rate which can produce a reduction in economic 
growth. 
     
Consequently the structural disturbances vector linked to each variable is: 
 
      Where  represent respectively the external shock, that is to 
say the emerging markets index or the United States stock exchange volatility, a real 
supply shock, a shock in the nominal exchange rate, a financial shock, and a monetary 
supply shock.       
 
2.3. The contemporaneous restrictions 
    The purpose of the study is to analyze the economies' response to financial shocks in 
the short term. Therefore, the period of analysis concerning the impact of the disturbances 
has been reduced to 12 months. We thus impose only contemporaneous restrictions in our 
model and we use the Bayesian procedure proposed by Sims and al. (1995, 1999)9.  
                                                                                                                                            
and al. (1991) because the model is not affected by the presence of a unit root. 
9 We used MONTEZHA.PRG Rats procedure which corresponds to Sims-Zha's approach for overidentified 
structural VAR. 
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    Our objective is to identify the n² elements of the P matrix. The Ω matrix is symmetric, 
consequently n(n+1)/2 orthogonalization constraints are already imposed. It is necessary 
to determine the n(n-1)/2 remaining constraints; we have chosen to impose 11 short term 
restrictions in reference to the economic literature, thus the model is over-identified.  
     Firstly, we consider the external variables (MSCI and SP) to be exogenous (Cushman 
and al., 1997, Mackowiak, 2007). Secondly, we follow the postulate of the authors who 
believed that the monetary authority's function of reaction, that is to say the interest rate, 
does not react immediately to a shock in price and production. Then we suppose that the 
monetary policy's response to these shocks and to financial disturbances10 is postponed 
for a month because of information delay (Sims and al., 1995, 1999, Kim and al., 2000). 
Finally, the hypothesis of a lag in the response of economic activity to international and 
national financial disturbances and to monetary shock is retained (Kim and al., 2000).   
Thus: 
 
     Following the information criteria of Schwartz, Akaike and Hannan-Quinn, four lags 
have been retained for all models and complementary tests underlined the absence of 
autocorrelation in the residuals11 
     The model is now identified. We can report, in the following section, the empirical 
results. 
                                                
10 National and international. 
11 Detailed information concerning the tests and their results is available on request.  
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3. The results 
     The countries' exchange rate regime is an important parameter to take into 
consideration as it influences the orientation of economic policies and subsequently their 
responses to a common shock. Over the periods of analysis, according to a de facto 
classification12, China is the only country which maintained a perfect fixed exchange rate 
with a peg to US Dollar until 2005 and then adopted a crawling peg. Some countries of 
the region experienced an intermediate regime before 1997 (Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Thailand) but, except for Malaysia, they were obliged to let their currency float after the 
Asian crisis. The other countries of the region have either made independent or managed 
floating regimes since 1990 (Japan, Korea, Philippines and Singapore). However, it is 
important to note that during the second period of analysis, Japan and Singapore are the 
only countries in the sample which have not used inflation or a monetary target.  
     We can suppose that the economies' responses to a common financial shock were 
divergent in the first period of analysis; many economic differences existed between 
developed and emerging countries and they had diverse exchange rate regimes. But after 
the Asian crisis, we can expect a better convergence in the countries' reaction for three 
main reasons.  Firstly, most of them have adopted a floating regime. Secondly, most of 
them have been harmed by the Asian crisis and have taken different measures to protect 
their economy against short term capital flows. Finally, all of them have decided to 
cooperate in order to reduce the risk of financial crisis with the implementation of the 
                                                
12 Bubula, A., Ötker-Robe, I., 2002, “The evolution of Exchange Rate Regimes since 1990: Evidence from 
De Facto Policies”, IMF Working Paper, 155. 
IMF, Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, 1990-2008. 
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Chang Mai Initiative13. The main objective is to reinforce regional financial surveillance 
and to develop assistance mechanisms in the event of financial difficulties and lack of 
liquidities in one of the countries of the region (development of bilateral swaps and 
repurchase agreement facilities in addition to the expansion of the ASEAN regional Swap 
Arrangement). Moreover, the financial integration of the Asean+3 countries was 
strengthened in 2003 with the Asian Bond Market Initiative which aims to develop 
regional liquid bond markets. 
     The graphics, in appendix 1, show the reaction of domestic variables after a one-
standard-deviation positive variation of the external variable. They reveal the significance 
level of the results if the interval of confidence does not include the 0 axis.  
3.1. The vulnerability of Asean economies at the end of the last century    
     First of all, we concentrate on the period 1990M1-1999M12 and we study the 
responses of Asean economies to a volatility shock on MSCI and SP (Appendix 1, figures 
1 to 16). Overall, the results underline the considerable vulnerability of emerging Asean 
countries to the SP shock. This phenomenon can be explained by the fact that the 
countries' exchange rates were linked to the US Dollar. Moreover, during this first period 
of analysis, there was a particularly strong influence of the US stock market in the global 
financial system (Kim and al., 2009).  
The reaction of the countries converges. However, the impact of the SP shock is more 
pronounced in emerging ones. This shock generates an immediate loss in international 
investors’ confidence, particularly significant in Thailand, Korea and Malaysia which 
experienced a large capital outflow (fa). In the developed countries the reaction of this 
                                                
13 May 6, 2000, Chiang Mai, Thailand. 
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variable is less significant because, in the nineties, they were the developing Asean 
economies' main creditors; in order to limit their exposure to risk on international markets 
they massively removed their investments in short-term capitals from these countries and 
did not experience an outflow of capital. Similarly, the impact on China’s capital flows is 
not significant because, during the nineties, the financial openness of the country was 
limited and the flows of international reserves controlled.  
This phenomenon is at the origin of a depreciation of the nominal exchange rate in the 
short term in all emerging countries of the region (ner), except China whose exchange 
rate stayed pegged to the US Dollar. We can notice a slight devaluation in the medium 
term in Singapore, which can be explained by an intervention of the Monetary Authority 
in this direction. Moreover, in the short term, Japan which exported 40% of its products 
to Asean countries experienced a short decrease in its growth rate and a temporary 
depreciation of its currency. But it was one of the world's largest holders of currency 
reserves at the time and the situation was quickly rectified.  
In order to limit the negative effects of this shock, the central bank of all countries in the 
region increased the nominal interest rate during the first months following the crisis (r). 
On this point, a slight difference exists between countries with fixed and floating 
exchange rates. The countries dependent on the United States' monetary policy 
experienced a less pronounced variation in their interest rate. They were influenced by 
the decrease in the US interest rate aimed at stimulating domestic economic growth. 
Finally, the increase in the interest rate level and/or the decrease of international reserves 
in the countries were at the origin of a decline in production in the entire region, more 
pronounced in emerging markets (y).  
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     During the same period, the countries' reactions to an MSCI shock are quite different 
except for Korea. The more industrialized countries (Japan and Singapore) and China 
were not significantly impacted by this shock. In the other countries, we note an outflow 
of international reserves revealing the investors’ loss of confidence (fa). This situation 
generates a devaluation of the nominal exchange rate (ner) less pronounced than those 
produced by an SP shock. But the main difference lies in the response of the nominal 
interest rate (r) which decreases in emerging Asean countries in order to boost economic 
growth (y) (particularly in Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia). This situation can be 
linked to less variation in capital outflows. 
     During this period, volatility shocks explain more than 10% of the variation in 
international reserves in the year following the shock. Moreover, they were at the origin 
of nearly 10% of production variation in most countries of the region (appendix 2, tables 
1 and 2). All the region's emerging countries were hit by the shock. It spread from the 
financial to the real sector of the economy. This underlines the vulnerability of emerging 
Asean countries to international fluctuations during the nineties and their incapacity to 
limit the negative consequences. This situation was due to their early capital account 
openness, at the beginning of the century, followed by excessive risk-taking, which is 
shown by the banking and financial indicators’ deterioration during the four years 
preceding the Thai crisis. To be more precise, the situation of the banking and financial 
sectors in Asean countries worsened after 1994 because of a large decrease in banking 
liquidities and a rise in short-term debt, increasing the total amount of external debt 
which was responsible for international lenders' loss of confidence (Corsetti and al., 
1999, Chang and al., 2000, Gimet, 2007). Our results demonstrate a spread of the crisis in 
all the region's emerging countries that corresponds to the “Fast and Furious” episode of 
contagion defined by Kaminsky and al. (2003).  
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3.2. The impact of the subprime crisis in  Asean countries 
     Secondly, we analyze the impact of the subprime crisis in the same economies 
(Appendix 1, figures 17 to 32). A volatility shock seems to have many different effects on 
these economies. These divergences cannot be explained by the exchange rate regime 
because all these countries, except China, have a free or managed floating exchange rate 
regime. However, the emerging Asean countries less dependent on the United States have 
been more vulnerable to an MSCI shock (appendix 2, table 4) due to their more 
pronounced economic and to a certain extent financial integration with the countries of 
the block and the other emerging markets (Kim and al., 2009)..  
After an SP shock, the countries which suffer from a significant inflow of capitals 
are the developed ones (fa). China has experienced capital flow volatility due to the 
gradual deregulation of its financial markets. Thailand and Indonesia have seen their 
international reserves decrease but only in the short run. Consequently, the impact on the 
other macroeconomic and financial variables is reduced in comparison to the last crisis 
episode in all emerging countries: the nominal exchange rate does not fluctuate 
significantly (ner) and the impact on production is limited (Malaysia, Korea, Indonesia), 
or not significant (Philippines, Thailand) (y). Thus, the monetary policy does not react 
massively. On the other hand, we note action on the interest rate by Singapore's central 
banks (r) and a pronounced decrease in production in Japan, Singapore and China. 
Finally, the crisis is at the origin of more significant volatility in these countries' 
exchange rate except in China which has maintained its crawling peg. 
 The reactions of the Japanese economy to an MSCI shock are equivalent to those 
of an SP shock. The country has experienced an outflow of capital and a reduction in its 
production. Similarly, China's growth has been reduced (y). Symmetrically, some 
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emerging markets (the Philippines, Thailand) that have not been vulnerable to an SP 
shock have not been impacted by an MSCI shock. However, we notice a small outflow of 
capital (fa) in Korea, Malaysia and Indonesia followed by a short devaluation of the 
nominal exchange rate (ner) and a slight increase in the interest rate (r) which contribute 
to a decrease of growth (y). Even if these countries' responses are less marked than during 
the first crisis episode, the economy's behavior reveals some weaknesses. 
     Thus when we compare these results with those of the previous period of analysis, we 
can make many comments. Firstly, the main differences in the countries' reaction can be 
explained by several factors. To begin with, the situation has changed at an international 
level. In recent years, international reserves have been concentrated in emerging countries 
which have become the new international lenders (in particular in China and OPEC 
countries) and the most developed economies, the new creditors. This situation explains 
these markets' greater vulnerability. Moreover, some emerging Asean countries which 
experienced the very negative impacts of their last crisis have decided to adopt prudential 
measures in order to protect their economies against speculative attacks and reduce their 
vulnerability to international financial shocks.  More precisely, they have limited short-
term capital inflows and consolidated their banking sector. Then, even if the amount of 
international flows of capitals in emerging markets has been more important than those in 
the first period of analysis (the region14’s gross external assets and liabilities has gained 
57 points of GDP from 1990 to 2006, Kim and al., 2009), the macroeconomics impacts 
were lower. Our analysis reveals the efficiency of these measures, in particular in 
Thailand and the Philippines. But some progress would be necessary in order to protect 
the entire region against these financial fluctuations for certain emerging countries 
                                                
14 Japan excluded. 
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(Korea, Malaysia and Indonesia) were still experiencing difficulties during the second 
period of analysis. 
4. The similarities in responses to a common shock 
     In order to compare the countries' reactions to each common shock, we propose an 
analysis of the correlation of the Asean economies' significant responses during the year 
following the shock (Appendix 3).  
     Symmetry in the countries' reaction and the economies' low vulnerability reveal a 
structural economic and financial convergence of these economies towards sustainable 
levels that guarantees international lenders' confidence.  
     For the first crisis episode, our results show a convergence in the response of all the 
domestic variables of Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand to a 
common SP volatility shock (table 5). In particular, the outflow of capital (fa) is very 
strong in these five countries. All the countries were forced to devaluate their exchange 
rate, except Japan where this devaluation was limited. The evolution of the variable ner is 
then correlated between most countries in the region. The reaction of the monetary 
authorities (r) was quite similar between countries, except for China which fixed its 
exchange rate and Japan that experienced a nominal interest rate at a low level. The crisis 
spread in the real sector and generated a reduction in production (y) in all the countries of 
the region, in particular the emerging ones.  
Some variables, like the interest rate, did not have the same evolution after an MSCI 
shock and thus the impact on the production is different. We can note a less important 
correlation in the emerging Asean economies' responses, in particular for Korea. Japan 
and Singapore were less vulnerable to this shock.  
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We can conclude that emerging markets were the most vulnerable to the financial shock 
during this crisis episode, in particular to the SP shock. The convergence in their 
reactions underlines the fact that, whatever the size and the exchange rate regime of these 
economies, they were hit by the crisis which spread from the financial to the real sector. 
Their intermediate exchange rate regimes were not sustainable. On the other hand, the 
financial and real impacts in industrialized countries are limited. China was an exception 
because its financial and economic openness was weak during this period. Thus, the 
reaction of its domestic variables is less correlated with the other Asean countries. 
Moreover, the disparity in the responses to MSCI shocks underlines the lack of structural 
convergence in the region during this period.   
     For the current crisis, our results are different from those of the previous period of 
analysis (table 6). We can note similarities in the reaction of industrialized countries, in 
particular Japan and Singapore, which experience an outflow of assets (fa) after a shock 
in SP and MSCI. At the same time, their exchange rate (ner) and their production (y) 
move in a similar direction.  
The responses of the domestic variables of Indonesia, Korea and Malaysia are quite 
similar but these countries are less vulnerable and their reactions to international shocks 
are more limited than in the previous period of analysis. The main negative impact in 
these three economies is on production. The Philippines and Thailand do not react 
significantly to these shocks.  
China maintains its crawling peg and its responses to the common financial shock are 
different from those of other countries in the region, except regarding its interest rate.  
We can thus conclude that the most industrialized countries are those most harmed by the 
crisis which spreads in the real sector of their economy. Moreover, a group of countries 
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formed by the Philippines and Thailand, which were the countries most vulnerable to the 
Thai crisis, have made significant progress in protecting their economy against 
international financial shock and in reinforcing their structural convergence. But many 
disparities still exist between the countries of the region and greater structural 
convergence is necessary in order to deepen their integration and envisage a monetary 
union. 
 
5. Conclusion 
    Our results highlight the negative impact of the financial crisis in emerging Asean 
economies at the end of the last century. They were very vulnerable to international 
financial fluctuations because their growth depended mainly on the confidence of 
international lenders who invested a considerable amount of short term capital in these 
economies. This situation reveals the inability of emerging Asean countries to prevent 
and absorb these types of shocks during this period. The fact that all the region's 
emerging economies were hit by the crisis shows that the exchange rate regimes in place 
during this period were not sustainable.  
    But the comparison of these results with those from the second period of analysis 
allows us to observe several significant differences. In fact the recent stock exchange 
volatility seems to have had limited impacts on certain emerging Asean countries. On the 
other hand, the negative effects are more significant in industrialized ones, including 
China. We can conclude that the measures adopted by the emerging Asean economies at 
the beginning of this decade have been very efficient. They decided to limit their 
dependence on short-term capital flows, to reduce the risk of illiquidity of their economy 
and to consolidate their banking sector. These actions have made it possible, to a certain 
extent, to maintain international lenders' confidence in a period of international 
 
 
21 
 
fluctuations and thus to limit capital outflows. Today, a group of emerging markets 
constituted by the Phillipines, Thailand and, to a certain extent, Malaysia, Indonesia and 
Korea, has made significant progress in improving its capacity to limit the negative 
impact of international financial fluctuations. Moreover, the similarities in the responses 
of the Phillipines and Thailand to a common shock highlight a better structural financial 
convergence between them and towards a sustainable level.  
       We can conclude that the recent financial crisis has spread in the most advanced 
countries directly through the financial channel which includes both banking exchanges 
between the countries and variations in financial assets. The crisis has extended from the 
financial to the real sector in these countries. Thus, the fundamental contagion of the 
crisis in emerging markets is indirect and is propagated through the real channel of trade 
links between them and industrialized countries. 
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Appendix 1. Asean countries responses to a MSCI and a SP shock 
Figures 1 to 16. Asean countries responses to a SP and MSCI shock during the first 
period. 
                                       China                                                    Indonesia  
                        SP                            MSCI                         SP                          MSCI 
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                     SP                            MSCI                         SP                          MSCI 
 
  
                                  Malaysia                                                   Philippines                   
                          SP                            MSCI                         SP                          MSCI 
 
 
                                     Singapore                                                   Thailand 
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Figures 17 to 32. Asean countries responses to a SP and MSCI shock during the second 
period                      
                                         China                                                   Indonesia                    
                             SP                            MSCI                         SP                          MSCI 
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Appendix 2. Forecast error variance decomposition further to a MSCI and a SP shock 
Tables 1 & 2. Forecast error variance decomposition further to a SP shock (1st period) 
Country period y ner fa r 
1 1.290 0.067 3.427 10.004 
2 3.912 0.261 5.473 9.081 
3 4.697 0.280 8.192 8.349 
6 7.890 4.721 8.262 8.303 
9 7.823 6.340 8.338 8.716 
 
 
Malaysia 
  
  
  
  
  
12 8.662 6.733 8.226 8.653 
 
1 1.359 0.993 5.879 1.946 
2 2.196 2.753 7.168 1.792 
3 4.656 3.429 7.038 3.289 
6 11.695 8.339 9.086 3.583 
9 12.939 10.972 9.226 3.341 
 
 
Philippines 
  
  
  
  
  
12 12.333 11.678 9.245 3.600 
 
1 1.596 0.269 14.686 0.291 
2 1.413 0.635 14.723 1.124 
3 4.839 1.631 14.331 1.941 
6 4.988 6.777 18.345 2.562 
9 4.927 6.717 19.625 2.637 
 
 
Singapore 
  
  
  
  
  
12 6.166 7.456 19.460 2.988 
 
1 1.794 0.219 0.047 5.037 
2 8.599 0.425 9.005 4.126 
3 9.150 1.222 9.209 4.486 
6 9.207 1.522 9.165 12.565 
9 9.180 2.596 8.812 14.249 
 
 
Thailand 
  
  
  
  
  
12 9.173 2.679 8.880 14.443 
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Tables 3 & 4. Forecast error variance 
decomposition further to a MSCI shock (1st 
period) 
Country period y ner fa r 
1 0.237 3.613 4.723 0.475 
2 2.356 3.272 5.698 1.929 
3 2.208 3.587 8.022 1.807 
6 2.118 3.668 10.685 2.098 
9 2.902 3.568 10.601 2.136 
 
 
China 
  
  
  
  
  
12 3.289 3.837 10.722 2.095 
 
1 0.718 0.006 2.122 1.965 
2 8.155 0.191 12.518 1.626 
3 8.128 1.287 12.570 1.587 
6 8.157 3.350 12.621 5.477 
9 8.973 3.777 12.939 6.235 
 
 
Indonesia 
  
  
  
  
  
12 8.934 3.946 12.932 7.255 
 
1 1.034 0.118 2.170 1.437 
2 0.835 1.519 2.293 1.612 
3 5.205 5.807 4.222 1.679 
6 8.396 7.861 4.530 3.079 
9 8.552 7.796 5.113 3.200 
 
 
Japan 
  
  
  
  
  
12 8.577 7.999 5.219 3.619 
 
1 14.152 0.530 0.620 0.007 
2 11.752 2.487 4.383 0.385 
3 16.394 2.353 4.170 2.846 
6 16.785 3.853 5.576 4.587 
9 18.354 3.667 5.523 5.282 
 
 
Korea 
  
  
  
  
  
12 18.250 3.999 5.619 5.440 
      
      
Country period Y ner fa r 
1 1.006 6.376 0.000 0.182 
2 3.065 8.700 0.260 4.477 
3 6.856 8.306 0.248 4.346 
6 8.909 10.423 1.616 6.194 
9 12.400 11.462 2.351 6.420 
 
 
Malaysia 
  
  
  
  
  
12 12.265 11.782 2.811 6.454 
 
1 1.962 0.105 4.300 0.955 
2 3.020 1.092 4.425 2.435 
3 6.847 1.760 4.078 2.353 
6 6.174 7.237 4.092 2.084 
9 8.450 7.634 5.252 2.243 
 
 
Philippines 
  
  
  
  
  
12 8.806 7.941 5.634 2.506 
 
1 2.040 7.755 0.030 0.670 
2 2.023 9.713 1.231 2.464 
3 1.795 12.862 11.260 2.484 
6 3.214 11.643 10.150 7.379 
9 4.714 13.671 10.584 7.439 
 
 
Singapore 
  
  
  
  
  
12 4.437 15.256 12.534 6.955 
 
1 0.009 0.085 0.140 0.004 
2 3.639 0.238 0.140 9.986 
3 3.533 3.736 1.744 9.622 
6 3.654 4.154 3.912 13.288 
9 3.608 4.061 5.051 13.576 
 
 
Thailand 
  
  
  
  
  
12 3.608 3.995 5.095 14.724 
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Tables 5 & 6. Forecast error variance 
decomposition further to a SP shock (2nd 
period) 
Country period y ner fa R 
1 0.154 0.231 3.119 0.743 
2 0.420 0.815 3.147 1.598 
3 0.735 0.729 4.533 8.626 
6 1.791 0.900 4.682 14.787 
9 1.959 1.434 4.736 14.559 
 
 
China 
  
  
  
  
  
12 1.963 1.937 4.846 14.705 
 
1 1.005 0.213 0.391 1.904 
2 0.801 13.975 0.334 7.314 
3 0.977 13.599 0.495 8.663 
6 1.988 10.885 4.893 10.000 
9 3.029 10.773 6.260 12.974 
 
 
Indonesia 
  
  
  
  
  
12 3.780 10.507 6.678 13.485 
 
1 0.062 21.035 0.212 0.017 
2 2.354 20.656 0.204 1.216 
3 2.155 18.882 1.852 1.388 
6 3.972 22.168 3.219 1.314 
9 4.516 22.079 3.116 2.022 
 
 
Japan 
  
  
  
  
  
12 4.487 22.347 3.115 2.050 
 
1 9.525 4.505 0.263 0.133 
2 8.689 10.621 0.754 0.572 
3 9.086 10.112 3.238 3.023 
6 9.112 10.886 3.530 2.801 
9 8.725 11.795 5.925 2.815 
 
 
Korea 
  
  
  
  
  
12 8.532 11.278 7.660 3.670 
      
      
Country  period y ner fa r 
1 1.969 2.172 0.167 0.192 
2 2.463 2.482 1.201 0.220 
3 3.035 2.718 1.095 0.197 
6 3.406 3.054 1.698 0.571 
9 3.283 4.716 2.906 1.071 
 
 
Malaysia 
  
  
  
  
  
12 3.297 5.178 2.935 1.418 
 
1 0.638 1.492 7.501 10.598 
2 0.636 6.276 7.187 10.817 
3 1.226 10.647 6.234 9.257 
6 2.585 9.332 9.600 17.080 
9 3.610 8.600 12.847 17.034 
 
 
Philippines 
  
  
  
  
  
12 4.146 8.809 13.794 16.536 
 
1 0.461 0.905 0.037 5.850 
2 1.055 3.411 2.733 6.435 
3 4.218 3.513 2.189 5.222 
6 4.949 4.160 6.408 4.525 
9 4.976 3.962 7.130 4.818 
 
 
Singapore 
  
  
  
  
  
12 5.577 3.854 7.018 4.748 
 
     1 0.433 0.005 4.142 0.002 
2 0.639 1.368 4.458 1.015 
3 2.157 2.045 4.161 1.363 
6 5.336 2.872 5.440 2.960 
9 6.670 6.665 5.479 4.637 
 
 
Thailand 
 
 
 
 
 
12 6.850 6.533 5.396 5.866 
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Tables 7& 8. Forecast error variance 
decomposition further to a MSCI shock (2nd 
period) 
Country period y ner fa r 
1 0.259 0.009 0.011 0.001 
2 0.263 0.066 2.373 0.736 
3 0.738 1.402 2.347 1.742 
6 0.753 2.467 2.685 3.030 
9 1.125 3.048 2.659 3.932 
 
 
China 
  
  
  
  
  
12 1.180 3.384 2.930 4.217 
 
1 2.880 0.037 1.165 1.809 
2 2.621 0.075 1.787 1.788 
3 11.197 0.169 1.522 2.529 
6 10.532 1.231 3.990 2.804 
9 10.222 2.096 5.983 3.151 
 
 
Indonesia 
  
  
  
  
  
12 10.217 2.817 6.446 3.320 
 
1 0.177 0.000 7.090 0.017 
2 2.019 0.019 6.245 0.224 
3 2.745 3.566 4.854 0.886 
6 3.867 10.431 4.566 1.216 
9 6.830 11.860 4.247 2.357 
 
 
Japan 
  
  
  
  
  
12 6.857 14.175 3.876 5.466 
 
1 1.424 0.958 0.009 7.247 
2 1.146 14.386 0.327 18.976 
3 1.088 15.997 0.707 20.223 
6 1.428 14.222 0.757 21.903 
9 2.178 16.138 1.156 20.676 
 
 
Korea 
  
  
  
  
  
12 2.085 16.544 2.046 20.559 
Country  period y ner fa r 
1 0.219 0.241 22.059 0.380 
2 0.543 0.416 22.771 0.713 
3 0.542 0.839 21.678 0.889 
6 0.562 3.689 25.062 0.898 
9 0.548 3.620 24.449 0.983 
 
 
Malaysia 
  
  
  
  
  
12 0.577 3.780 24.322 1.115 
 
1 1.701 4.146 21.552 1.998 
2 1.917 5.266 22.038 1.957 
3 6.138 6.663 20.262 2.933 
6 7.630 8.743 18.676 8.576 
9 7.997 8.659 18.835 9.210 
 
 
Philippines 
  
  
  
  
  
12 8.118 9.066 18.887 9.331 
 
1 2.969 2.355 15.568 0.420 
2 5.043 6.741 16.015 6.924 
3 4.847 10.896 14.105 11.924 
6 9.827 10.020 15.779 12.120 
9 11.073 9.577 15.217 13.060 
 
 
Singapore 
  
  
  
  
  
12 11.719 9.399 15.368 13.133 
 
1 12.602 0.530 22.709 1.951 
2 12.442 2.743 21.203 1.935 
3 10.749 14.408 18.845 1.672 
6 11.496 19.484 20.481 1.725 
9 10.512 23.594 22.154 2.047 
 
 
Thailand 
  
  
  
  
  
12 10.750 23.463 21.947 2.133 
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Appendix 3. Correlation of the 
responses of the Asean countries to each 
financial shock. 
Table 9. Responses to a SP shock (1st period) 
 y ner fa r 
China-Indo 0.0998 0.6379 -0.1219 -0.3393 
China-Japan 0.7208 0.6909 0.3479 0.1437 
China-Korea -0.3590 -0.3076 -0.6455 0.6974 
China- Malay 0.4624 0.9401 -0.1518 -0.3996 
China-Phil 0.0667 0.9037 0.4850 -0.1848 
China-Singa 0.3599 0.3957 0.1897 0.0479 
China-Thai 0.2491 0.6255 0.2041 0.3378 
Indo-Japan 0.2340 0.8211 0.2738 0.2567 
Indo-Korea 0.6842 0.6473 0.6764 0.6356 
Indo-Malay 0.8514 0.7066 0.6049 0.6988 
Indo-Phil 0.2086 0.3708 0.2539 0.2445 
Indo-Singa 0.7111 0.4387 0.0103 0.5170 
Indo-Thai 0.9622 0.8511 0.2001 0.3257 
Japan-Korea -0.6987 0.3309 -0.2149 0.5144 
Country period y ner fa r 
1 7.884 12.336 0.741 0.370 
2 7.270 14.688 1.134 3.120 
3 6.876 14.619 1.135 3.066 
6 7.093 19.390 1.237 3.222 
9 10.802 19.005 1.577 3.436 
 
 
China 
  
  
  
  
  
12 10.892 19.266 1.704 3.457 
 
1 0.011 1.136 6.209 13.585 
2 5.241 1.413 8.170 11.964 
3 11.366 1.703 8.137 10.943 
6 10.830 2.874 11.836 11.555 
9 10.674 2.840 12.704 12.262 
 
 
Indonesia 
  
  
  
  
  
12 10.688 2.887 12.700 12.257 
 
1 8.671 3.585 0.000 4.698 
2 13.766 3.459 0.101 7.072 
3 12.185 6.351 0.671 6.107 
6 14.438 14.588 1.937 5.655 
9 14.168 20.649 1.807 5.992 
 
 
Japan 
  
  
  
  
  
12 14.062 21.485 2.041 6.171 
 
1 1.863 2.324 8.560 0.468 
2 3.689 10.238 8.929 1.150 
3 4.456 9.953 9.046 1.214 
6 5.735 12.028 9.605 3.442 
9 5.864 11.975 10.865 3.523 
 
 
Korea 
  
  
  
  
  
12 5.897 12.081 10.902 4.660 
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Japan-Malay 0.6218 0.7546 0.4508 0.0703 
Japan-Phil 0.4519 0.7963 0.5119 -0.3667 
Japan-Singa 0.5866 0.4294 0.2972 0.3628 
Japan-Thai 0.3281 0.9192 0.8767 0.6217 
Korea-Malay 0.2431 0.2034 0.5056 0.225 
Korea-Phil 0.4398 0.2880 0.2301 0.2187 
Korea-Singa 0.0662 0.0519 -0.0195 0.3807 
Korea-Thai 0.3014 0.4592 0.2967 0.6282 
Malay-Phil 0.3293 0.8236 0.2711 0.5175 
Malay-Singa 0.8456 0.5058 0.1968 0.0242 
Malay-Thai 0.8939 0.7551 0.6286 0.4422 
Phil-Singa 0.3097 0.2731 -0.2657 -0.0745 
Phil-Thai 0.2519 0.7222 0.3217 0.1189 
Singa-Thai 0.7109 0.5789 0.5288 0.1915 
 
 
 
Table 10. Responses to a MSCI shock (1st period) 
 y ner fa r 
China-Indo 0.0667 0.2535 -0.2099 0.2581 
China-Japan -0.6341 0.2829 0.4485 -0.2721 
China-Korea 0.4686 0.5926 0.1264 -0.0160 
China- Malay -0.3494 -0.4294 0.2430 -0.1196 
China-Phil 0.4833 0.8256 0.0926 0.0228 
China-Singa -0.3067 0.1895 -0.1902 -0.0795 
China-Thai 0.3200 0.3144 0.2407 -0.2211 
Indo-Japan -0.1787 0.2244 0.1719 0.2025 
Indo-Korea 0.1532 0.0639 0.2765 0.3222 
Indo-Malay 0.1473 0.2573 0.1948 0.1873 
Indo-Phil 0.4923 0.0346 -0.05615 0.02347 
Indo-Singa -0.5776 0.6776 0.8938 0.6302 
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Indo-Thai 0.5329 0.4127 0.6715 0.3243 
Japan-Korea -0.1599 0.7473 0.2172 0.6462 
Japan-Malay 0.7680 -0.1330 0.1204 0.6255 
Japan-Phil -0.4000 0.3190 -0.3912 -0.6653 
Japan-Singa 0.0841 0.4527 0.3019 0.2632 
Japan-Thai -0.0118 0.6705 0.4231 0.8313 
Korea-Malay -0.2634 -0.2500 0.8182 0.8567 
Korea-Phil 0.8215 0.7667 -0.6160 -0.6772 
Korea-Singa -0.3942 0.1538 0.3091 0.0392 
Korea-Thai 0.8338 0.7538 0.7063 0.7676 
Malay-Phil -0.2439 -0.5102 -0.1631 -0.1730 
Malay-Singa 0.1310 0.1697 0.1329 -0.0860 
Malay-Thai 0.0058 -0.2574 0.4429 0.7413 
Phil-Singa -0.3578 -0.1654 -0.6175 -0.3838 
Phil-Thai 0.8848 0.4719 -0.0641 -0.0565 
Singa-Thai -0.5393 0.4779 0.6683 0.2030 
Table 11. Responses to a SP shock (2nd period) 
  y ner fa r 
China-Indo 0.7096 -0.8981 0.4778 0.1174 
China-Japan 0.3153 -0.5830 0.7337 -0.0511 
China-Korea -0.4887 0.6095 -0.6583 0.4278 
China- Malay 0.6795 0.5826 -0.2041 0.2424 
China-Phil -0.2080 -0.2847 0.0547 0.3266 
China-Singa -0.4371 0.4473 0.2757 0.0128 
China-Thai 0.5136 -0.8589 -0.6497 0.1967 
Indo-Japan 0.4302 0.7196 0.1138 0.6744 
Indo-Korea 0.4737 0.4090 0.2040 0.6933 
Indo-Malay 0.4677 0.4368 0.6399 0.4358 
Indo-Phil -0.1809 0.2188 -0.3566 0.0328 
Indo-Singa -0.1773 -0.4502 -0.5067 0.1684 
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Indo-Thai 0.3492 0.1410 0.1180 -0.5550 
Japan-Korea -0.6368 -0.6214 -0.2918 0.7057 
Japan-Malay 0.0468 -0.2766 0.0604 0.7528 
Japan-Phil -0.3628 0.2998 0.1461 -0.1325 
Japan-Singa 0.3703 0.2866 0.2376 -0.2242 
Japan-Thai 0.3820 0.6352 -0.4744 -0.8157 
Korea-Malay 0.4856 0.5228 0.1728 0.7458 
Korea-Phil 0.3518 -0.0579 0.1330 0.1165 
Korea-Singa 0.3770 0.6105 -0.4355 0.0475 
Korea-Thai -0.7097 -0.8189 0.3281 -0.3194 
Malay-Phil -0.3471 -0.2450 0.1728 -0.0987 
Malay-Singa 0.0863 0.8323 0.5377 -0.0602 
Malay-Thai -0.2507 -0.7941 -0.0692 -0.3408 
Phil-Singa 0.0438 -0.2711 0.2735 -0.0074 
Phil-Thai 0.3432 0.2648 0.2951 0.2726 
Singa-Thai -0.6916 -0.7035 -0.5979 0.3786 
Table 12. Responses to a MSCI shock (2nd period) 
 y ner fa r 
China-Indo -0.1415 0.1488 -0.3499 0.0483 
China-Japan -0.5386 -0.7141 -0.5262 0.0566 
China-Korea -0.3207 0.5450 0.2545 0.1352 
China- Malay -0.1708 0.6242 0.3104 0.1213 
China-Phil 0.1754 -0.3816 -0.3416 -0.1316 
China-Singa 0.1253 0.2531 -0.0467 0.1754 
China-Thai 0.2021 -0.5353 0.0142 -0.0972 
Indo-Japan -0.5331 -0.1163 0.1842 0.1969 
Indo-Korea 0.2640 0.2591 0.2971 0.1405 
Indo-Malay 0.3053 0.1084 0.4284 0.4867 
Indo-Phil -0.0064 -0.1912 -0.3052 0.1353 
Indo-Singa -0.0190 0.6088 -0.4091 -0.1100 
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Indo-Thai -0.8571 -0.4688 -0.4124 0.6789 
Japan-Korea 0.5142 -0.6083 0.0160 0.7306 
Japan-Malay 0.7145 -0.8422 -0.1199 0.5522 
Japan-Phil 0.1283 0.2293 0.2293 0.1603 
Japan-Singa 0.1487 0.2531 0.4348 0.1939 
Japan-Thai 0.6251 0.0667 -0.5382 -0.2864 
Korea-Malay 0.6315 0.5983 0.4428 0.6902 
Korea-Phil 0.1550 -0.0360 0.1080 0.2928 
Korea-Singa -0.0853 -0.1139 -0.1799 0.6885 
Korea-Thai 0.1054 -0.0006 -0.3177 -0.7056 
Malay-Phil 0.1160 -0.1797 0.1496 0.3620 
Malay-Singa -0.0944 -0.3216 0.4095 0.6545 
Malay-Thai 0.1660 0.0757 0.0168 -0.1507 
Phil-Singa 0.0940 -0.2025 -0.0601 0.6108 
Phil-Thai 0.1718 0.1233 0.2621 0.1142 
Singa-Thai 0.0501 -0.6774 -0.1666 -0.4885 
 
